The God of Princes by Wilfred M. McClay
The God of Princes
Wilfred M. McClay on the Political Use of Religion
As the strange and unsettling presidential election of 2000 recedes from view,
it is important to remember that controversies over prescription drugs and the
physiognomy of “chads” were not the only salient issues arising
in the course of the campaign.
Indeed, we may by now have forgotten that there was a fleeting moment, early
on, when it appeared the election might produce a fresh reconsideration of the
proper role and limits of religion in public life. Making this development all
the more exceptional was the fact that, for the first time since the days of
William Jennings Bryan, the “religion question” was being raised
by a Democratic candidate: Connecticut Senator Joseph Lieberman, an avowedly
observant “modern orthodox” Jew.
Lieberman’s remarkably frank and enthusiastic public declarations of his
religious sentiments in the days and weeks immediately after his selection as
Al Gore’s running mate were stunning departures from the norm, and immediately
generated quite a storm of controversy and commentary. His fervent and frequent
expressions of gratitude to “our awesome God” were music to the
ears of many Evangelical and Roman Catholic voters, who might otherwise have
been disinclined to pay any attention to a Democrat. In addition, he gave a
thoughtful, if somewhat vague and uneven, speech at Notre Dame during the campaign’s
home stretch, in which he seemed to endorse the necessity of moral absolutes,
extolling the “inextricable link” between “our rights”
and “our belief in God and a higher law.”
Remarkably Fluid Stances
But at the same time, those with eyes to see soon became aware that Senator
Lieberman is a very complicated man, capable of transforming himself at will
into a remarkably fierce and unscrupulous political partisan—a man whose
high moral stances prove to be remarkably fluid and negotiable, and whose principal
goal is not moral uplift but political victory, at no matter what cost. One
could be forgiven for thinking that his conspicuous religiosity had, in the
end, only been another posture in the service of that same old Democratic Leadership
Council staple: political triangulation.
One could see elements of this particular triangulation strategy beginning
to take shape as early as the summer of 1999, at which time the veteran New
Democratic strategist and longtime Gore advisor Elaine C. Kamarck confidently
assured the Boston Globe that “the Democratic Party is going
to take God back this time.” Anyone who has closely watched President
Clinton’s astounding success in using bits and pieces of biblical language,
blended with psychobabble and crocodile tears, to win over the hearts of many
status-anxious Evangelical pastors and editors, knew that this was by no means
an impossible task.
Indeed, there is a genuine hunger abroad in the land for public acknowledgment
of the Deity, and there is no reason why Republicans should be the only ones
trying to satisfy it. The challenge for Democrats, however, was that of finding
a path between confining fundamentalism and New Age wackiness, and establishing
a position that plausibly evoked the sturdiness of the Judeo-Christian tradition
without being overly committed to it.
So when Ed Rendell, chairman of the Democratic National Committee, let out a
very public exhalation just before the Democratic convention, to the effect
that Joe Lieberman would have been an excellent vice-presidential candidate,
if only—sigh!—the country were ready to accept a Jewish candidate
for national office, it did not take a genius to see that the selection had
probably already been made, and the ground was being prepared for it. Gore’s
choice would be presented to the world not only as a dramatic distancing from
Bill Clinton, but as a heroic blow against entrenched prejudice.
If this heroic blow turned out actually to be rather more like the kicking-in
of an open door, well, no matter. The American people could join in on the fun,
and congratulate themselves for being innocent of the anti-Jewish bigotry of
which they were being implicitly suspected. And those who had substantive criticisms
of Lieberman would likely feel inhibited, if not silenced, by fear of just such
a charge.
Lieberman would, in short, be instantly immunized against many of the vulnerabilities
facing other pro-religion candidates. No one could plausibly accuse him of insensitivity
to religious and ethnic minorities, nor could anyone suspect him of plotting
to impose a theocracy. On the contrary, there was ample reason for all Americans,
and not merely Jews, to look with unusual favor upon such a candidacy.
Moreover, as an observant Jew he could carry the pro-religion banner more convincingly
than Mr. Gore, who gibed ignorantly in a July speech to the NAACP that “the
last time that Moses listened to a ‘bush,’ his people wandered in
a desert for forty years.” Lieberman would not say anything so stupid
and sophomoric, and might even be counted upon to know something about the Hebrew
Bible. And his willingness during the Clinton impeachment controversy to criticize
Clinton’s sexual misadventures in much stronger terms than Gore had ever
ventured—although not strong enough to insist upon any meaningful punishment—redounded
to his credit.
So Lieberman came to the ticket with strong credentials. Yet there was something
amiss in his manner from the beginning. His unrestrained delight over his selection
by Gore seemed not quite appropriate—it was more like the rain dance of
a pass-intercepting linebacker than the sober gratitude of a genuinely pious
man. His rhetoric and cadences when Gore introduced him as his choice on August
8th in Nashville sounded so Evangelical that one almost thought he would burst
into a rendition of the Christian Doxology.
And his use of religious language and themes in the weeks thereafter seemed
increasingly off-key, and strangely gratuitous. His ludicrous comparison of
Bill Clinton to Moses parting the waters of the Red Sea, his discovery of an
entitlement to government-funded prescription drugs folded into the penumbras
of the Ten Commandments, and his theologically incoherent declaration that we
are all “citizens of God”—all these and more suggest a man
who is very comfortable publicly invoking God’s holy name, but who has
really not thought very deeply about the appropriate role of religion, and in
particular his own religion, in public life.
Lieberman’s Offense
It did not hurt him politically when he attracted “friendly fire”
from secularists, beginning with the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), which found
Lieberman’s language “an affront” that risked “alienating
the American people.” This was entirely predictable. As early as February
2000, Barry Lynn, executive director of Americans United for Separation of Church
and State, had complained that Kamarck’s statement to the Globe,
and Gore’s divagations about “what Jesus would do,” were indications
that Gore was intending to make “religion a centerpiece of his campaign.”
Lynn might as well have been cheering them on.
Anyone who thought that opposition from the ADL and Barry Lynn would hurt
the Gore-Lieberman ticket must also believe that Bill Clinton was harmed in
1992 by his willingness to attack Sister Souljah and be attacked in turn by
Jesse Jackson. That, after all, is what triangulation is all about: publicly
trashing your permanent “hard” allies, who have nowhere else to
go—and who will generally accept the assurances of a furtive wink—precisely
to win over some temporary “soft” friends—whom you can later
abandon, as convenience dictates. That appears to be just the game being played
here.
Which is why Senator Lieberman’s role in the game now deserves more sober
attention than it has so far received. The ADL, Americans United, and others
of their persuasion were entirely right, in my view, to complain that Lieberman’s
use of religious language was inappropriate. But they were wrong about the specific
nature of the offense. They operate upon the premise that religion ought to
be entirely a private matter, and that therefore any religious expression in
public is undesirable, particularly when it comes from the mouth of a public
official, and can thereby be construed as an “affirmative endorsement”
of religion, in violation of the First Amendment. Lieberman’s God-talk
is to be frowned upon, in this view, as an unacceptable intrusion of the private
into the public.
Oddly enough, many who enthusiastically endorsed Lieberman’s open religiosity
presented it in essentially the same terms, except that for them it is no intrusion.
Instead, it is simply a matter of following out the logic of expressive freedom.
The paradigm one heard invoked is the familiar one of “coming out of the
closet.” Being openly religious is now to be thought of as yet another
“out-of-closet experience,” comparable to openness over one’s
sexual behavior and other matters of personal “identity,” which
a more rigid and formal America consigned to the realm of private life when
it did not forbid them altogether.
But both of these positions are wrong, because both falsely presume that religion
is always and only a private matter. To be sure, a great deal of religious practice
should be confined to the private realm. Jesus spoke for the entire Judeo-Christian
tradition when he enjoined believers not to pray “on the street corners
to be seen by men,” as the hypocrites do, but in the closeted privacy
of their rooms. And there is every reason for believers and nonbelievers alike
to celebrate our nation’s achievement of a robust secular state, in which
most of the business of life can be conducted without reference to divisive
religious issues.
That does not mean, however, that religion should invariably be regarded as
a private matter. Indeed, squelching religious speech defeats one of the chief
purposes of having a secular state, and a First Amendment, to begin with. Religious
liberty is one of the chief ends of political society, and not merely a means
to some other end. The recourse to genuinely religious speech in public should
be—if I may borrow a phrase—safe, legal, and comparatively rare.
But when it happens, it should be the real thing, and not merely the functional
equivalent of “Gesundheit,” or what the courts call “ceremonial
deism,” which is a nice legal way of saying “empty gesture.”
What we are faced with is not a problem with the toleration of religious discourse.
That shouldn’t even be an issue. But there remains a problem, with which
we are now wrestling, in defining the appropriate uses of such discourse.
Rendering Faith Suspect
I fear that the senator, who could have done much good, did nothing to advance
our thinking about these matters, and much to retard it, by giving fuel to the
secularists’ fire, confirming all their worst suspicions, sullying his
own reputation for integrity, and rendering the proposition of a more robust
place for faith in American life far more suspect than it ought to be. It may
well have helped the Gore-Lieberman campaign win over some swing voters. But
it made him a very bad advocate for what would otherwise have been a good cause.
The problem with Lieberman’s God-talk is not that it was excessively religious.
The problem is that it was consistently shallow and almost entirely gratuitous,
a form of credential-flashing that was shockingly devoid of real content and
without any real connection to the theological and moral particulars of his
own rich religious tradition. He indulged our era’s penchant for Oprah-speak
about what a great thing “faith” is, while remaining studiously
vague about the proper objects of one’s faith—and the often stern
moral demands that such faith may place upon us.
The word religion comes from a Latin word meaning “to bind.”
But the faith Lieberman suddenly began to parade as never before in his political
career seemed to be bound only to a proximate political agenda.
There are many reasons why even the unbelieving should want religious speech
to be protected in America. But chief among these is the fact that our civilization’s
religious traditions continue to be the most profound meditation on the meaning
of human life, and therefore the single most important source of enduring moral
insight and guidance available to us. We will find ourselves more and more desperately
in need of such guidance, as we plow further into the morally uncharted waters
where our science and technology are taking us at breathtaking speed.
Lieberman’s candidacy could have raised some profoundly important questions
for us. For example: What can the perspective of orthodox Judaism, and the larger
Judeo-Christian tradition, tell us about the most pressing problems of public
policy? What resources does Lieberman’s religion provide him, and us,
for finding our way in these matters? The potential for public good coming out
of such discussions would have been enormous, in no small part precisely because
of the unthreatening nature of Lieberman’s faith, which does not advocate
evangelization or proselytizing, but which clearly shares many of the same moral
and theological premises as those embraced by the Christian majority.
And it is not as if potential moral applications are not readily at hand.
They fairly cry out to us at every turn. Are we to believe that a religion whose
central affirmation is of a Creator God who has endowed every human being with
the traces of his own image, and upon whose authority rests a comprehensive
law of life, has nothing useful to say to us about such issues as partial-birth
abortion, euthanasia, welfare policy, divorce, homosexuality, same-sex unions,
experimental use of human embryos, and human cloning—but offers us authoritative
pronouncements on Sabbatarian car-driving and elevator-riding?
Partisan Cheerleading
It is disappointing, to say no more, that Lieberman as a vice-presidential candidate
backed away from his former positions on some of these issues and declined to
make use of the resources of his faith in thinking about others. But his real
offense is something much worse than the routine shiftiness of an ambitious
politician.
So long as he chose to beat the drum for God like a partisan cheerleader, he
made it that much harder for others to do so seriously and fruitfully. When
John F. Kennedy vowed to privatize his own Catholicism, he at least let it stay
private. Lieberman wanted to have it both ways at once: to be able to engage
in breezy and nonspecific God-talk in public, while eschewing any God-think
that might challenge the Democratic party line. If that is the only option open
to us, we would be better off to go back to the naked public square. At least
then we would not be mocking God by invoking his name while ignoring his words.
Fortunately, these are not the only possibilities. But as we explore the limits
of religious speech in an increasingly post-secular America, believers and nonbelievers
would do well to remember the 146th Psalm, which begins with words of adoration—“I
will sing praise to my God as long as I live”—but then bluntly reminds
us: “Do not put your trust in princes, in mortal men who cannot save.”
That is very sound advice, whatever your beliefs. And it also applies to presidents,
vice-presidents, senators, and governors, of both political parties.
None of which is to imply that Christians should withdraw from public life.
On the contrary, it is to insist that they have something indispensable to contribute
to public life. But what makes that contribution so vital is its grounding in
a Reality that is beyond public life, a devotion to the King of Kings and Lord
of Lords. They will have something precious to contribute to public life precisely
so long as public life does not command their ultimate loyalties. To imagine
otherwise is to imagine salt without its savor.
Wilfred M. McClay holds the SunTrust Chair of Humanities at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga, and is the author of The Masterless: Self and Society in Modern America (North Carolina) and A Student?s Guide to U.S. History (ISI Books). He is a member of the Presbyterian Church, U.S.A. |